














THE UK ONLINE HARMS WHITE PAPER AND THE 
INTERNET’S CABLE-IZED FUTURE 
ERIC GOLDMAN* 
CONTENTS 
I.  THE WHITE PAPER’S SUPPORTING EVIDENCE 
HIGHLIGHTS THE INTERNET’S BENEFITS, NOT ITS 
ILLS .................................................................................. 352	
II.  THE WHITE PAPER’S WORST POLICY DETAILS ....... 355 
III.  THE INTERNET’S CABLE-IZED FUTURE .................... 360 

















* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the High Tech Law Institute, Santa Clara 
University School of Law. egoldman@gmail.com, http://www.ericgoldman.org. I 
submitted a version of these comments to the U.K. Online Harms office during their 











The Ohio State Technology Law Journal 
 
352 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.2 
 
 
The U.K. has embraced Internet censorship before, such as its (now-
abandoned1) plan to require an Internet driver’s license to view online 
pornography.2 In April 2019, the U.K. released a white paper about 
online harms (the “White Paper”).3 The White Paper proposes to take 
Internet censorship to a new height, essentially unmatched by any 
other Western democracy. It’s a sign of how comprehensive 
censorship has moved beyond repressive regimes to become trendy 
even in leading Western economies. 
 
To redress a wide range of anti-social online activity, the White Paper 
seeks to tightly circumscribe user-generated content—so tightly that 
only a small number of Internet giants will be able to profitably 
publish user-generated content. Other Internet publishers will be 
pushed towards licensing professional content and cover those costs by 
charging subscriber fees to consumers. Thus, the White Paper will 
produce a reconfigured Internet 3.0 that will resemble the cable TV 
industry, not the current Internet we know and love. 
 
This essay addresses three main points. It first deconstructs some of 
the “facts” the White Paper uses to justify its censorious ideas. Then it 
highlights some of the proposal’s worst policy aspects. The essay 
concludes by explaining how the White Paper will reshape the Internet 
and kill off most user-generated content. 
 
I. The White Paper’s Supporting Evidence Highlights the 
Internet’s Benefits, Not Its Ills 
 
The White Paper occasionally acknowledges the Internet’s benefits. 
For example, it says “seven in ten parents think screen time is essential 
for their children’s learning development” and the “internet opens up 





1 See Rory Cellan-Jones, UK's Controversial 'Porn Blocker' Plan Dropped, BBC 
(Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50073102 
[https://perma.cc/M6ET-UFMH].  
2 Digital Economy Act 2017, 2017 c. 30, §14 (UK). 
3 DEPARTMENT FOR DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT & HOME OFFICE, ONLINE 
HARMS WHITE PAPER, 2019, Cm. 57 (UK) [hereinafter Online Harms White Paper].  
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expression.”4 These are powerful benefits that should not be casually 
disregarded.  
 
Unfortunately, the White Paper quickly blows past the few positive 
words it has about the Internet. Principally, the White Paper’s drafters 
treat the Internet as a threat to society—as serious as health and 
financial threats that require heavy government intervention to protect 
consumers.5 Moreover, the White Paper expresses hostility towards 
technology generally, including seemingly irrelevant swipes at offline 
technologies, such as TV screens,6 and technologies likely outside the 
paper’s regulatory scope, like private email.7 
 
As we often see with arguments in favor of regulating technology, the 
White Paper skews its supporting facts to highlight its perceived 
problems, even when that requires intellectual corner-cutting. The 
White Paper repeatedly cites a 2018 Ofcom survey in support of its 
policy proposals.8 After the White Paper draft but before the end of the 
consultation period, Ofcom released its 2019 version of the same 
survey,9 and that version highlights some of the factual problems 
underpinning the White Paper. 
 
For example, the 2019 survey claimed that 79% of 12-15-year olds 
reported having a “potentially harmful experience online” in the past 
12 months.10 That sounds troubling . . . except that “[t]hese things 
were not necessarily classified by respondents as harmful . . . .”11 The 





4 Id. at 17-18.  
5 See, e.g., id. at 22.  
6 See, e.g., id. at 28 (¶1.37). 
7 See, e.g., id. at 50 (box 25). 
8 OFCOM & INFO. COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE, INTERNET USERS’ EXPERIENCE OF HARM 
ONLINE (2018) (UK), https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/120 
852/Internet-harm-research-2018-report.pdf. 
9 OFCOM & INFO. COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE, INTERNET USER'S CONCERNS ABOUT 
AND EXPERIENCE OF POTENTIAL ONLINE HARMS (2019) (UK), https://ico.org.uk/ 
media/about-the-ico/documents/2615000/online-harms-chart-pack.pdf. 
10 Id. at 7.  
11 Id. at 37.  
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about 75% of the kids who experienced “offensive language” said they 
were not concerned about it.12 
 
Despite this, the survey listed “swear words/offensive language” as the 
#1 “potentially harmful online experience,” with 39% of kids reported 
experiencing “swear words/offensive language” online.13 This number 
seems dubiously low—by about 61 percentage points.  
 
More importantly, the proper baseline for comparison is the number of 
kids who experienced “swear words/offensive language” offline. I 
assume 100% did. It is disingenuous to characterize “swear 
words/offensive language” as a “potentially harmful online 
experience,” especially if the percentage of children experiencing it 
offline is higher than online (in which case more coarse discussions 
are taking place offline than on).14 
 
The survey also shows how much people love the Internet. One page 
says “despite the concerns raised, the majority agree that the benefits 
of going online outweigh the risks;”15 another says six out of ten 12-15 
year olds “agree that the internet makes children’s lives better.”16  
 
These survey findings helpfully contextualize the White Paper. The 
survey nominally provides (dubious) support for the White Paper’s 
narrative that online experiences are terrible, yet the survey even more 
strongly also clearly supports a counter-narrative that the Internet is 






12 See id. at 49 (9% said they experienced offensive language and were concerned; 
30% said they had experienced offensive language and weren’t concerned). 
Including the children who claimed they had not experienced offensive language, 
over 80% of the children total said they were not concerned about offensive 
language. Id. 
13 Id. at 37. 
14 The White Paper occasionally (if unenthusiastically) acknowledges that humanity 
is awful offline too, and in a couple of places it tries to isolate how much harm is 
uniquely caused online vs. the baseline set of harms. See e.g., ONLINE HARMS WHITE 
PAPER, supra note 3, at 19, 28. 
15 OFCOM & INFO. COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE, supra note 9, at 72. 
16 Id. at 73. 
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II. The White Paper’s Worst Policy Details 
 
The White Paper offers several policy “innovations” that are each 
individually terrible. Combined together, they create an unsalvageable 
policy disaster. I will highlight four major conceptual problems with 
the White Paper. 
 
a. Duty of Care to Keep Users Safe  
 
In the U.S., the courts have roundly rejected plaintiffs’ efforts to 
impose “duty of care” obligations on Internet services, largely due to 
Section 230.17 In 2019 alone, cases seeking to impose “duty of care”-
style obligations on online intermediaries have been rejected by the 
D.C. Circuit,18 the Second Circuit,19 and the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court.20 
 
The White Paper strikes a different path. Extending its analogy to the 
health and financial industries, it would impose a duty of care on 
online services “to take reasonable steps to keep their users safe and 
tackle illegal and harmful activity on their services.”21 
 
This duty of care approach lays a foundation for unlimited liability. 
Each time a harmful incident takes place online, the burden effectively 
shifts to the Internet service to demonstrate how they took reasonable 
steps to avoid the incident. 
 





17 A key case on this topic is Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 
2016) (“[C]laims that a website facilitates illegal conduct through its posting rules 
necessarily treat the website as a publisher or speaker of content provided by third 
parties and, thus, are precluded by section 230(c)(1).”). See generally Eric Goldman, 
The Ten Most Important Section 230 Rulings, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 
(2017). 
18 Marshall’s Locksmith Service Inc. v. Google LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 
2019). 
19 Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 Fed. Appx. 586, 589 (2d Cir. 2019).  
20 Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 386 Wis.2d 449, 726 (2019).  
21 E.g., ONLINE HARMS WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 19, 28. 




To avoid that unmanageable legal risk, the White Paper proposes that a 
government regulator would set minimum standards which, if 
complied with, would satisfy the duty of care.22 Internet services 
would have the freedom to deviate from the minimum standards, but at 
the peril of proving that their deviations nevertheless complied with 
the general duty of care. Few online services would take the risk of 
deviating—at least, not without express approval from the regulator—
so the government-set minimum standards would become the de facto 
standards across the industry.  
 
It is theoretically possible the government-set standards could 
simultaneously accommodate both Internet giants and small hobbyists. 
More likely, the Internet industry will need more than one standard to 
cover the vast range of Internet activities. Most likely of all, the 
government-set minimum standards would optimize for regulating the 
behavior of a few Internet giants (i.e., every regulator wants to “fix” 
Facebook) and thereby set standards that few other services could 
afford to meet. 
 
The White Paper briefly acknowledges that the government regulator 
would need to be sensitive to the anti-competitive/anti-innovation 
effects of its minimum standards,23 but what incentive does the 
regulator have to do this? It’s hard to prove ex ante that regulation will 
destroy innovation; that effect usually becomes clear only ex post, 
when the damage is already done. Furthermore, a regulator charged 
with keeping online activities “safe” will necessarily prioritize safety 
over innovation. Thus, the government-set minimum standards to 
satisfy the duty of care inevitably will be set in a way that stifles 
innovation and hard-wires a uniform set of practices for the Internet 
industry. 
 





22 Id. at 41.  
23 Id. at 55.  
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The White Paper does not identify the regulator charged with setting 
the minimum standards to satisfy the duty of care.24 Whatever 
regulatory body undertakes this work will necessarily engage in 
pervasive censorship. Setting a duty of care requires the regulator to 
dictate what third-party content Internet services can and cannot 
publish. The White Paper seemingly aspires to frame Internet safety as 
a goal that can be achieved without content censorship; in practice, the 
regulator of Internet safety will function as a government-operated 
censorship board.  
 
Censorship boards are common in repressive countries (e.g., Russia’s 
Roskomnadzor25), but, until recently, most democracies try to avoid 
blatant censorship. Between the White Paper’s proposal and Senator 
Josh Hawley’s proposal to turn the FTC into a censorship board,26 
formalized Internet censorship is now apparently mainstream 
discussion fodder—even in leading Western democracies. 
 
One twist: the White Paper proposes to fund the censorship board by 
taxing the regulated Internet companies.27 If Internet safety is such a 
crucial social value, it should be funded with general taxpayer funds—
but that’s clearly too politically unpalatable. In contrast, no one will 
lament dunning Google and Facebook for more cash. However, this 
financing plan will create substantial and inevitable opportunities for 
regulatory capture and rent-seeking, because the censorship board will 
have repeat interactions with the regulated entities who are paying its 





24 Id. at 57. 
25 Postanovleniia RF o Federalʹnoĭ sluzhbe po nadzoru v sfere svi͡ azi, 
informat͡ sionnykh tekhnologiĭ i massovykh kommunikat͡ siĭ [Regulation of the 
Russian Federation on the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, 
Information Technology and Mass Media], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.], 
March 24, 2009, No. 228, https://rg.ru/2009/03/24/polozhenie-dok.html. 
26 Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019); see also 
Eric Goldman, Comments on Sen. Hawley’s “[Ending] Support for Internet 
Censorship Act,” TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 10, 2019), https://blog.ericgoldman. 
org/archives/2019/07/comments-on-sen-hawleys-ending-support-for-internet-
censorship-act.htm.  
27 See ONLINE HARMS WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 58. 
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which routinely sides with the “customers” who pay its bills—patent 
owners28—over the public it is actually supposed to serve. 
 
Note further that if Google and Facebook have outsized influence with 
the censorship board, then they will be happy to coordinate with the 
censorship board to establish minimum duty of care standards that 
hinder their competition. We’re already seeing Facebook routinely 
embrace censorship regulations globally29—co-opting government into 
expensive legal standards that only companies like Facebook can 
afford. Rather than fight this unhealthy dynamic, the White Paper will 
amplify it. 
 
d. Regulation of Lawful Harmful Content  
 
The White Paper aspires to regulate legal but harmful content: “The 
regulatory approach will impose more specific and stringent 
requirements for those harms which are clearly illegal, than for those 
harms which may be legal but harmful, depending on the context.”30 
 
The Internet services’ duty of care would require them to moderate—
that is, suppress—lawful content. The drafters obfuscate this crucial 
point in several ways: (1) suggesting that the duty of care will be less 





28 E.g., Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 1965, 1985 (2009); Brian Kahin, The Expansion of the Patent System: 
Politics and Political Economy, FIRST MONDAY (2001), 
https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/828/737; Josh Landau, USPTO 
Strategic Plan Focuses on Patent Owners, Ignores Public, PATENT PROGRESS (Aug. 
29, 2018), https://www.patentprogress.org/2018/08/29/uspto-strategic-plan-focuses-
on-patent-owners-ignores-public/.  
29 See e.g., Mark Zuckerberg, The Internet Needs New Rules. Let’s Start in These 
Four Areas, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2019, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mark-zuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-
rules-lets-start-in-these-four-areas/2019/03/29/9e6f0504-521a-11e9-a3f7-
78b7525a8d5f_story.html; Sheryl Sandberg, FACEBOOK (Feb. 26, 2018, 11:45 AM), 
https://www.facebook.com/sheryl/posts/10159945887600177?pnref=story 
[https://perma.cc/T998-ZNKJ] (advocating in favor of FOSTA). 
30 ONLINE HARMS WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 42.  
31 See id. at 42. 
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many ways that legal content causes harm,32 and (3) by lumping 
harmful content and unlawful content together in its discussion.33  
 
To highlight the latter point, consider the table below, where each 
column mixes illegal content with legal content.34 For example, in the 
right column, excessive screen time is completely legal; in the middle 
column, many types of “intimidation” are completely legal (even if it 
is likely antisocial behavior); in the left column, some types of 
harassment are illegal and others are not. This commingling of illegal 
and legal content helps the White Paper broaden its scope while 
making it harder to identify the situations where it is talking about 






32 E.g., id. at 22.  
33 E.g., id. at 31, 66-76.   
34 Also, the table’s “clear” vs. “unclear” taxonomy does not work. As just one easy 
example, what is considered a “hate crime” is ambiguous in the U.K. (and 
everywhere else).  
35 ONLINE HARMS WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 31 tabl.1.  
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This exposes a fundamental conundrum in the White Paper: why is the 
U.K. government proposing to obligate Internet services to police legal 
content, rather than making such content illegal? This is a direct and 
broad form of censorship; not the more typical “collateral” 
censorship36 when publishers prophylactically over-block borderline 
lawful content to ensure that no unlawful content slips through. 
Clearly, there’s no longer any concern about blatant censorship even in 
Western democracies. 
 
III. The Internet’s Cable-ized Future  
 
In the mid-1990s, it was widely assumed that the Internet would look 
like the cable industry, where a relatively small number of large-ish 
online cablecasters would publish professional content to paid 
subscribers. Indeed, the leading commercial online services of the 
era—including AOL, CompuServe and Prodigy and smaller 
competitors like GEnie,37 Delphi,38 and eWorld39—deployed cable-
style business models.40 Users paid monthly fees to access walled 
gardens of content, and the online services shared some of the 






36 See e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2295, 2296 (1999); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of 
Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 295-96 (2013). 
37 Steven J. Vaughn-Nichols, Before the Web: Online Services of Yesteryear, ZDNET 
(Dec. 4, 2015, 2:27 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/before-the-web-online-
services/ [https://perma.cc/HL6B-EHY9].  
38 Arlyn Tobias Gajilan, They Coulda Been Contenders: Once Upon a Time, Delphi 
Was Fighting It Out with AOL. Then Along Came Rupert., FORTUNE SMALL BUS., 
Nov. 1, 1999, https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_archive/1999/11/01/2700 
56/index.htm.  
39 Benj Edwards, Remembering eWorld, Apple's Forgotten Online Service, 
MACWORLD (June 9, 2014, 3:44 AM), https://www.macworld.com/article/220 
2091/remembering-eworld-apples-forgotten-online-service.html 
[https://perma.cc/5CEB-73XU]. 
40 E.g., Vaughn-Nichols, supra note 37. Even the small but highly influential online 
community The Well had this business model. See Katie Hafner, The Epic Saga of 
The Well, WIRED (May 1, 1997, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/1997/05/ff-well/ 
[https://perma.cc/EL6H-R28C].       
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Miraculously, the Internet industry evolved into something very 
different than the cable industry. Aided by late 1990s-era laws like 47 
U.S.C. §230 and 17 U.S.C. §512, online services fostered the massive 
growth of amateur-created content41—content that turned out to be 
exceptionally valuable to society. The move from cable-style 
professional content to (typically uncompensated) amateur content 
defined the “Web 2.0” phenomenon. Today, virtually all of the most 
popular Internet services heavily or exclusively publish 
uncompensated amateur content. 
 
We’re nearing the end of Web 2.0. Regulators across the globe are 
cracking down on user-generated content, creating a nearly 
impenetrable phalanx of regulation that will make user-generated 
content virtually unpublishable. As just one recent example, the E.U. 
Copyright Directive’s Article 17 will require online services to deploy 
upload filters on user-generated content.42 These mandatory filters will 
suppress lots of legitimate user-generated content; and any filtering 
mistakes will create potentially business-ending liability. Furthermore, 
the costs of deploying upload filters will drive many small online 
services out of the market altogether.  
 
Collectively, these dynamics will drive many online services to simply 
give up on user-generated content altogether. Instead, the services will 
prefer to license professionally generated content as a way of reducing 
their risks of infringement.43 Of course, professional content producers 
will want to be paid for licensing their content. This pushes the 





41 See Goldman, supra note 16. 
42 Directive (EU) 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and 
amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 119-21, 
https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2019.130.01.0092.
01.ENG. This provision gained notoriety as “Article 13” until a last-minute 
renumbering of the Directive’s provisions. See Karina Grisse, After the Storm--
Examining the Final Version of Article 17 of the New Directive (EU) 2019/790, 14 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 887, 887 (2019). 
43 Professional content licensors might also be willing to provide financial assurances 
in the case of unexpected infringement claims, such as indemnities to the licensee or 
insurance coverage. 
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structure, where a relatively small number of larger online services can 
afford upload filters or license fees, and everyone else exits the 
industry. 
 
The UK Online Harms White Paper accelerates the Internet’s cable-
ization. The costs required to satisfy the duty of care will produce the 
same effects as the Article 17 upload filters. Internet giants like 
Google and Facebook will absorb the costs of regulation; other 
services will publish only professional content to avoid those 
regulatory costs; and other services will exit the industry. The White 
Paper’s proposals will function like a “neutron bomb” of Internet 
regulation. It would leave the Internet’s “infrastructure” nominally 
intact, but it would depopulate the Internet of most of its content, 
leaving a dystopian Internet wasteland in its wake. 
 
The White Paper’s drafters might prefer a cable-ized Internet. 
Undoubtedly it will be “safer” . . . but at what cost? I also would like a 
“safer” Internet, but I prefer even more a well-functioning and robust 
Internet that enables human self-expression. Prioritizing safety over 
the Internet’s fundamental interactivity brought to mind the old idiom, 
popularized by Justice Frankfurter, about overreaching regulations that 




I hope that the White Paper’s vision of the Internet ultimately gets 
rejected. However, even if that happens, the cumulative crush of 
Internet regulatory burdens—still being manufactured daily—almost 
certainly ensures the Internet’s inevitable cable-ization. It’s only a 






44 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).  
